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Abstract— Low-rate application layer distributed denial of 
service (LDDoS) attacks are both powerful and stealthy. They 
force vulnerable webservers to open all available connections 
to the adversary, denying resources to real users.  Mitigation 
advice focuses on solutions that potentially degrade quality of 
service for legitimate connections. Furthermore, without 
accurate detection mechanisms, distributed attacks can bypass 
these defences. A methodology for detection of LDDoS attacks, 
based on characteristics of malicious TCP flows, is proposed 
within this paper. Research will be conducted using 
combinations of two datasets: one generated from a simulated 
network, the other from the publically available CIC DoS 
dataset. Both contain the attacks slowread, slowheaders and 
slowbody, alongside legitimate web browsing. TCP flow 
features are extracted from all connections. Experimentation 
was carried out using six supervised AI algorithms to 
categorise attack from legitimate flows. Decision trees and k-
NN accurately classified up to 99.99% of flows, with 
exceptionally low false positive and false negative rates, 
demonstrating the potential of AI in LDDoS detection. 
Keywords— DoS, LDoS, LDDoS, Distributed Denial of 
Service, Low rate attack, RoQ, Artificial Intelligence, Network 
Defence, Machine Learning, Deep Learning, Computer Security, 
Cyber Security. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In an increasingly connected digital world, reliable and 
secure access to our online resources has never been more 
important. 60% of people in the UK are using e-banking, 
doubling in just nine years [17] and 1.61 billion of the 
world’s population shop online [21]. But with reliance on 
these platforms comes a serious threat from malicious 
attackers seeking to degrade and deny access to these 
services.  
Application layer attacks are a relative newcomer to the 
hacker’s toolkit with the frequency and potency set to 
increase in the coming years [8]. Many of these attacks 
exploit weaknesses within the HTTP protocol. A subset of 
these attacks are known as low-and-slow, or low-rate DoS 
(LDoS). They do not require vast swathes of traffic to 
overload services and can go undetected with static 
fingerprints. 
Research and mitigation advice regarding LDoS attacks 
are primarily focussed on altering the configuration of the 
webserver, rather than detection of attack streams. This can 
reduce the quality of service for legitimate users.  
The aim of this study is to detect application layer 
LDDoS attacks through TCP flow metadata analysis, from a 
distributed attack. The specific application layer attacks that 
will be categorised will be: slowread, slowheaders and 
slowpost. All flows will be run against six supervised 
machine and deep learning algorithms for binary 
classification in to attack or legitimate flows. Analysis will 
highlight the best algorithms and features to be used for 
detection of LDDoS attacks.. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
LDDoS attacks are LDoS attacks that are launched from 
hosts distributed on the Internet. A low-rate DDoS (LDDoS) 
attack has significant ability to conceal its traffic because of 
its similarity with normal traffic Since LDoS was initially 
proposed in [8], a series of variants of LDoS attacks have 
been discussed, including: Reduction of Quality (RoQ) 
attacks [4] that exploit the performance vulnerability during 
a system’s adaptation process and LDoS attacks targeting 
application servers (LoRDAS attacks) [9]. 
Whilst there has been much research in DoS/DDoS, 
LDoS/LDDOS attacks, there are some common weaknesses 
throughout literature that should be addressed, especially 
related to the quality of the data analysed. For instance, many 
studies used far too little and outdated data, up to two 
decades old, [2], [11], [1]. This will miss many of the 
modern attack vectors that utilise LDoS capabilities and 
reduce the ability to generalise conclusions to modern 
systems. Furthermore, mitigation advice based on reducing 
the number of connections allowed from a source IP address 
have the potential to reduce the QoS for users [12], this is a 
weakness that must be solved if effective mitigation of 
LDDoS attacks is to be employed.  
A significant amount of the literature regarding LDoS 
and LDDoS attack mitigation have not utilised recent 
advances in machine learning and deep neural networks to its 
full extent. They have focussed on too few traffic features, 
[5], [10], [21], [12], [13]. An optimal number of features will 
reduce the quantity of false positives, whilst maintaining 
relatively low computational overheads. Artificial 
intelligence may also create an adaptive model, capable of 
understanding the standard traffic flows to a web server. This 
can be achieved through understanding the features of the 
TCP flow that may highlight and attack stream.  
Through analysis of the best feature set and testing 
against various algorithms, it may be possible to find a 
solution that can detect the presence of LDoS and LDDoS 
attacks from TCP flows. This methodology has not been 
employed in literature analysed. It will produce a detection 
mechanism that will highlight LDDoS TCP flows, before 
they cause a DoS attack.  
The proposed methodology seeks to overcome criticisms 
of the studies mentioned by improving the test datasets, 
diversity of features and number of algorithms used to 
ascertain the best combination to generate high accuracy. 
III. PROPOSED METHOD 
In the section below, we will analysed the proposed 
methodology followed in steps 
A. Concept 
As identified in the previous section, existing methods 
have had limited success in dealing with LDDoS, either due 
to generating excessive false positives and denying access to 
legitimate users or, to provide robustness, monitoring traffic 
from the volume perspective and producing false negatives. 
While it is very easy to note the limitations, identifying a 
solution to overcome them is a rather complex issue, as the 
chosen method should not rely on timing-related patterns, yet 
be able to discriminate attack traffic.  
One possible approach is to consider the use of TCP 
connection characteristics to be used as discriminating 
features. From a functional perspective, the connection 
characteristics are indicative of the client behaviour. While 
for a typical client the main objective is to download the data 
and close the connection, an LDDoS connection is more 
likely to keep the connection open and occupy server 
resources in the process. In the case of slowread, 
slowheaders and slowpost, rather than terminate the 
connection, the attack connections aim to exhaust server 
resources through all transport-related alternatives – read or 
send data at a very low rate, maintain the connection open 
for as long as possible, and collectively, occupy server 
memory until legitimate clients are denied access. The 
connections associated with such an attack would not be 
detected by either rate- or volume-based features; at best, 
they may be identified as a poorly-connected client in terms 
of performance. However, looking at TCP connection 
parameters, with client-related parameters in particular, 
would indicate that the client is indeed aiming to stall the 
connection and drain server resources.   
In this context, this paper investigates the use of TCP 
connection parameters as a discriminator for identifying 
LDDoS attacks. The method is aiming to differentiate the 
stalling behaviour of attack flows versus normal, legitimate 
connections, by separating network traffic into TCP 
connections, extracting the associated TCP parameters into a 
connections dataset, and passing the dataset through an AI-
based analysis. 
B. Pre-processing 
The raw traffic must be pre-processed in order to produce 
a dataset of TCP parameters dataset to be used as input for 
the method. The analysis must be robust in order to be able 
to cope with relatively large data rates, but also sufficiently 
complex to extract all the relevant TCP parameters. While a 
bespoke solution is likely to be the more accurate alternative, 
the TCPtrace analysis tool can deliver a comprehensive set of 
parameters in an automated fashion, including a total of 142 
characteristics associated with a connection. While a 
significant proportion of these parameters are likely to be 
irrelevant for the LDDoS detection, particularly the ones that 
relate to the network performance, such as RTT or 
retransmissions, or connection control (SYN and FIN packet 
count), TCPtrace also extracts the necessary endpoint-based 
parameters, such as receiver-advertised window or initial 
congestion window, or stalling-related parameters, such as 
idle time. 
In order to simplify the decision process, the full set may 
be processed through the chosen classification methods, 
which can subsequently determine the optimal subset to be 
used as preferred features. 
C. Classifier 
The behaviour of a TCP connection is rather complex, 
with both endpoint- and network-related parameters 
influencing the perceived performance of a data transfer and 
the resources demand that it places on the server. Given this 
complexity, together with the input data, the classifier plays a 
critical role in the process, as its ability to discriminate 
between legitimate and attack connections depends on the 
relationship between parameters for both legitimate and 
attack traffic. To ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the 
TCP parameters feature set, the preferred option for the study 
was to process the resulting dataset through several 
classification methods, including Logistic Regression, k-NN, 
SVM, Decision Trees, Random Forest and Deep Neural 
Network. The results of the six classifiers were then 
compared in terms of accuracy, confidence matrix, false 
acceptance and rejection rates, and evaluation speed. 
IV. EVALUATION 
The section below is divided into two sub-sections for better 
understanding how the evaluation was conducted.  
A. Environment and dataset 
As indicated in the review section, prior studies used 
various attack datasets, but they all shared the same 
limitation, as were not necessarily focused on LDDoS 
attacks. For this study, the preferred alternative was to 
produce a bespoke set, to include a mix of genuine and attack 
traffic. A topology of 24 legitimate clients, 8 attackers, and 
one web server was created in GNS3. The creation of a 
simulated network capable of generating hundreds of 
thousands of TCP flows, enough for machine learning 
training and testing was fundamental to the success of this 
project. The simulation was created in GNS3, using 
containers for all network nodes. Figure 1 is a overview of 
the network topology. 
 
Figure 1 - Simulated network topography overview 
The webserver was configured in a typical LAMP stack 
(Linux, Apache v2.4 HTTP server, MySQL database and 
PHP), using the default Apache settings and was set to run 
five websites. The legitimate activity was simulated and 
configured to randomly selected URLs stored on the 
webserver. It also simulated the HTTP POST method, by 
sending data to the MySQL database. In addition to traffic 
passing through at the unrestricted rate of 1Gbps, the 
scenario also included emulated slow connections by 
applying traffic shaping and throttling traffic to 11520 bps 
for some of the connections.  The scenario included 84 
hours of traffic generation, to include several types of 
attack, as summarised in Table 1. The resulting traffic was 
collected in pcap format using Wireshark on a network tap 
between the webserver and switch. The PCAP files were 
then processed using TCPtrace to extract the TCP 
connection parameters. 
 
Table 1 - Summary of simulations performed and TCP Flow count 
 
Tool Met
hod 
Traffic 
type 
Duration Node 
count 
TCP Flow 
count 
Siege GET Legiti
mate 
18 hours 18 69969 
Siege POS
T 
Legiti
mate 
6 hours 6 107299 
Siege GET Throttl
ed  
24 hours 18 10569 
Siege POS
T 
Throttl
ed 
12 hours 6 185471 
Slowrea
d 
GET Attack 8 hours 8 80305 
Slowhe
aders 
GET Attack 8 hours 8 22312 
Slowbo
dy 
POS
T 
Attack 8 hours 8 78325 
 
In order to generalise the results and allow for comparison, 
the dataset was used in conjunction with the CIC Dataset, an 
application layer DoS dataset generated by the University of 
New Brunswick [6], filtered to include only web activity. 
Four datasets were produced, as listed in Table 2 below, by 
normalising, labelling and merging the simulated traffic and 
CIC dataset. 
 
Table 2 – Test datasets 
 
D
at
as
et 
CIC 
Attack 
Flows  
CIC 
Legitimat
e Flows  
Simulated 
Attack 
Flows 
Simulated 
Legitimate 
Flows 
Total 
TCP 
Flows  
1 9311 9311 9305 9305 37233 
2 9355 9355 0 0 18710 
3 0 0 34586 34758 69344 
4 0 66472 180942 373308 620722 
 
Each of the four datasets has a slightly different purpose. 
Dataset 1 represents a balanced environment, with an equal 
amount of legitimate and attack simulated flows. Dataset 2 
and 3 are to determine whether using a simulated 
environment has an impact on the accuracy of the 
estimation, as opposed to capturing traffic from a real 
network. Finally, dataset 4 evaluates the ability of the 
classification algorithms to generalise across a mix of 
simulated and real traffic by combining the legitimate traffic 
in the CIC dataset with the traffic from the simulations run. 
 
B. Processing 
Data processing involved three stages: feature selection, 
parameter tuning, and classification. Feature selection was 
achieved through Recursive Feature Elimination with 10-
fold Cross Validation (RFECV) using SVM. The analysis 
indicated that the accuracy does not improve when 
increasing the number of features beyond 20 features, with 
the same subset making a significant impact on detection. 
To support the decision, some of the features appeared to be 
heavily correlated, as shown in Figure 22; the correlation 
analysis was run against dataset 1. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Features correlation analysis 
The automated RFECV analysis was then followed by a 
review of the parameters to determine correlated features. 
Following the two-stage selection, the dataset was filtered to 
include only the features giving the highest accuracy for 
LDDoS detection, as listed in Table 3.  
 
Table 3 - Feature selection with descriptions 
Feature Description 
avg_win_adv_a2b Average window advertisement.  
data_xmit_time_a2b Data transmit time.  
max_win_adv_a2b Maximum window advertisement.  
throughput_a2b Average throughput. 
max_owin_a2b 
Maximum outstanding unacknowledged 
data (bytes) 
resets_sent_a2b Number of reset packets sent.  
avg_owin_a2b 
Average outstanding unacknowledged 
data (bytes) 
max_#_retrans_a2b Retransmitted bytes, client to server.  
min_segm_size_a2b Minimum segment size. 
initial_window_bytes_a2b 
Total number of bytes sent in the initial 
window.  
idletime_max_a2b 
Maximum idle time between consecutive 
packets 
idletime_max_b2a 
Maximum idle time between consecutive 
packets 
triple_dupacks_a2b 
Triple duplicate ACKs sent from client to 
sever.  
unique_bytes_sent_a2b Total number of unique bytes sent. 
 
Six classifiers were chosen to determine the effectiveness of 
the TCP connection parameters in LDDoS detection: 
Logistic Regression (LG), k-NN (KNN), SVM, Decision 
Trees (DT), Random Forest (RF) and Deep Neural Network 
(DNN). The aim behind the wide range of classifiers was to 
determine whether the choice of classifier does have a 
significant impact on the detection or the accuracy would be 
mainly due to the selected set of features. The analysis was 
performed using the TensorFlow machine learning 
framework [18] which allows automating the workflow data 
processing.  
The classification stage involved running all six algorithms 
over the pre-processed input datasets. The output metrics for 
analysis were as follows: accuracy values from 10-Fold 
cross-validation, false positive rate (FPR), false negative 
rate (FNR). Besides accuracy, the algorithms were also 
assessed in terms of efficiency by monitoring the time it 
took to process to classify the data. In terms of training and 
testing, datasets 1-3 had a 1/2 train/test ratio and dataset 4 
had a 10/90 test/train split. 
V. RESULTS 
The table 4-7 below shows the results from the classification 
algorithms. We can see that k-NN and decision trees 
appeared to perform better, but all methods led to very high 
accuracy. 
Table 4 - Results 
Datas
et 
LG LG KNN SVC DT RF DNN 
1 
Accur
acy 
95.85 99.81 97.39 99.87 99.07 97.06 
FPR 7.76 0.08 4.09 0 0.58 N/A 
FNR 1.09 0.19 0.44 0.03 4.79 N/A 
Eval 
time 
[s] 
0.023 0.558 1.87 0.019 1.842 471.9 
2 
Accur
acy 
94.82 99.96 99.96 99.96 99.93 99.96 
FPR 1.8 0 0 0 0.16 N/A 
FNR 9.65 0.03 0 0 0.13 N/A 
Eval 
time 
[s] 
0.017 0.221 0.092 0.013 1.261 305.7 
3 
Accur
acy 
98.75 99.86 99.77 99.92 99.41 99.47 
FPR 1.77 0.06 0.26 0 0.56 N/A 
FNR 0.62 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.57 N/A 
Eval 
time 
[s] 
0.034 1.096 1.727 0.029 2.951 510.8 
4 
Accur
acy 
92.75 99.9 99.35 99.92 99.41 99.47 
FPR 21.63 0.14 0.91 0 1.31 N/A 
FNR 1.3 0.03 0.54 0 0.14 N/A 
Eval 
time 
[s] 
0.51 61.21 463.3
8 
0.505 581.8
4 
5203 
Dataset 1 was used to observe how an equal mixture of 
legitimate and attack traffic would impact the classification. 
The results indicated excellent performance for k-NN, 
decision trees and random forests; given the results are 
based on 10-fold cross validation, the results do not suffer 
from overfitting. The exceptionally low FPR and FNR rates 
of the decision trees and k-NN indicate a value low enough 
to use within an IDS or IPS and 
demonstrate the potential of automated IP blocking for 
LDDoS prevention, as they would be unlikely to adversely 
affect a substantial quantity of legitimate flows. For decision 
trees, only two flows out of 6235 were inaccurately classed 
as legitimate with also the fastest evaluation time of all the 
classifiers of 0.019s for over 12000 TCP flows, using 14 
features. This speed further highlights the potential for real-
time flow categorisation. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the inaccuracy of both logistic regression and SVM was due 
to their bias towards categorisation of attack traffic, leading 
to an unacceptably high FPRs of 7.78% and 4.09% and 
being almost 2% less accurate than the better performing 
classifiers. Aside from the performed parameter tuning, it is 
possible to slightly improve on the results and lead to a 
more balanced FPR and FNR split. However, the FNR rates 
are high, even in this biased setting relative to the more 
accurate classifiers, which indicates they are unlikely to be 
more accurate than decision trees or k-NN. Finally, the deep 
neural networks performed disappointingly compared to the 
more successful classifiers, achieving the second lowest 
accuracy of 97.061%. Similar to the parameter tuning, 
results could be marginally improved with a larger number 
of epochs, but it is unlikely that the increase would be 
statistically significant. 
Dataset 2 was based on the CIC data. As it can be seen in 
the results, all classifiers performed excellent, with both 
SVM and decision trees having no false positives or false 
negatives, and k-NN only having one malicious TCP stream 
misclassified as legitimate. The exception was logistic 
regression, which had a high false positive rate of over 9% 
and its accuracy was more than 5% below the other 
classifiers. An additional observation that can be made 
based on these results is that the high categorisation is 
possibly indicative of the lack of artificially generated slow 
traffic; this was the purpose of the throttled traffic within the 
simulated network activity. Given this, it is possible that 
some of the detection is based on the algorithms 
categorising slow and fast TCP activity, as the attack traffic 
emulates very slow TCP connections. 
Dataset 3 was a single dataset experiment consisting of a 
balanced mix of over 70K TCP flows from the simulated 
network. The accuracy of k-NN, SVM and decision tress 
was exceptional, with decision trees having wrongly 
classified only one flow in the test data subset. The high 
accuracy for k-fold cross validation indicates a well-fitting 
model, capable of performing well on new input data from 
this network. The deep learning algorithms also performed 
very well with 99.962% accuracy; the learning process 
plateaued after 50 epochs, so it may be worth exploring as 
part of future research whether a lower learning rate could 
further improve the results. It is worth noting that, as part of 
this simulation, the traffic was throttled to simulate 
legitimate TCP connections running over slow links. This is 
likely to have caused the a high FNR for the logistic 
regression method, but it did not affect the other algorithms, 
which were all successful in classifying the activity.  
Dataset 4 aimed to observe the ability of the algorithm to 
classify a highly unbalanced dataset, which includes a 
significant amount of legitimate traffic from both the CIC 
dataset and simulated network. Despite the unbalanced 
nature of the dataset the accuracy for all algorithms, except 
logistic regression, were very high. Decision trees is the 
clear best with a FPR and FNR of 0.001% and 0.004%, 
respectively. This represents only misclassification of only 
11 TCP flows out of over half a million flows. k-NN 
performed well also, with FPR and FNR of 0.031% and 
0.14%, respectively. The main advantage over decision trees 
compared to k-NN is not simply the accuracy, however. The 
evaluation time for k-NN is 61.21s while decision trees is 
only 0.505s. In an IDS/IPS this evaluation time is vital to 
avoid processing overload and to cope evaluating vast 
quantities of TCP connections to a busy webserver. This is 
where the speed and accuracy of decision trees will show 
the true benefit as each flow will take a millisecond to 
categorise and potentially block. This is a significant step 
towards the mitigation of LDDoS attacks. Once again, 
logistic regression is the lowest performing classifier, with a 
very high FNR of 21%. This indicates bias and high 
sensitivity for the data and can be seen in the ROC curve 
gradients and the low precision score of 90.163%. Tweaking 
the classifier parameters could mitigate some of the 
inaccuracies. However, it is unlikely to perform better than 
decision trees with its near perfect score and slightly faster 
(by 0.07s) evaluation time. The accuracy of the deep neural 
network was relatively high at 98.954%. However, the 
graph indicates the gradient still converging, rather than 
plateauing. With additional epochs, this may have improved 
a few hundredths of a percent. However, the training and 
evaluation time for a dataset this size was high, being 86 
minutes for evaluation compared to 0.505 seconds for 
decision tree evaluation. With a lack of powerful parallel 
processing capabilities running the tests for longer would 
not significantly alter the conclusions of this research. These 
results highlight how well this methodology can work 
across very large datasets, with relatively few training 
examples. The near perfect results from the decision trees 
once again shows how useful this algorithm is for 
classification of attack and legitimate streams. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The primary aim of the research was to ascertain if machine 
learning, using TCP performances as features, could be 
employed to detect malicious LDDoS attacks amongst 
legitimate activity, utilising artificial intelligence and TCP 
flow metadata. The results of the validation tests indicate 
that accurate categorisation can indeed be achieved. Both k-
NN and decision trees accurately detect the activity with 
such low FPR and FNR that once the model is trained, they 
could be used to automatically block the attacking flows. 
significantly reducing the danger of these attacks. The 
techniques employed within this project categorise the TCP 
flows independent of the source IP address, thereby making 
equally effective against both single source and distributed 
attacks. 
Through analysis of these results clearly machine and deep 
learning algorithms performed well across all the datasets. 
The deep learning model achieved an accuracy of 97-99.9%. 
However, the complexity of neural networks did not 
outperform the lightweight machine learning algorithms. 
The relatively significantly longer time taken to train and 
test these networks is an unnecessary drain on 
computational resources, that does not lead to an 
improvement over faster and more lightweight algorithms 
such as decision trees and k-NN. It is possible that will 
lower learning rates, more data and thousands more epochs 
accuracy could be improved. This is unlikely to be a 
proportional gain relative to the extra computational 
overheads, especially in the presence of other fast and 
accurate algorithms. 
The extra computational time require for random forests led 
to less accurate results than the decision trees in all the tests. 
This could be due to the time and effort taken to pick 
relevant and accurate features in stage 1 of the evaluation. 
Logistic regression was the least accurate throughout, with 
Dataset 1 having almost double the FPR of the second least 
successful algorithm. It is possible that there were issues 
with the parameter selection of the classifier, causing 
excessive bias and sensitivity throughout the classification 
of the activity. The most accurate algorithms throughout 
were k-NN and decision trees. They were capable of 
extremely low FPR and FNR across all datasets and tests. 
The evaluation time per flow and consistently high accuracy 
across all tests for decision trees makes it the clear favourite 
algorithm for binary classification of LDDoS activity. The 
speed and the extremely low FPR and FNR demonstrate that 
this could be used for automated detection and mitigation of 
malicious TCP flows real-time in an IPS system. 
Dataset 4 had a dual purpose – to determine the capacity of 
the method to generalise when presented with other traffic, 
but also to determine its robustness, as the test/train ratio 
was 10/90, with 2.5 times more legitimate activity. Even 
with this data, all models bar logistic regression and DNN 
achieved over 99.3% k-fold validation precision and with 
low FPR and FNR. It was anticipated that decision trees 
were likely to be the most successful, which was confirmed 
by experimental validation.  The lack of accuracy with the 
logistic regression could highlight the data not being linearly 
separable, as this tends to be more accuracy for classifying 
data of that sort. The SVM RBF kernel outperformed the 
linear kernel, which supports this conclusion.  
The main limitation of this research is that fact it was carried 
out entirely on two datasets, based on simulated attacks, 
which may be perceived as slightly biased. Lack of parallel 
GPU processing capabilities consequently led to lower 
epochs and higher learning rate than would have been 
optimal for achieving the best accuracy level. Volume of 
data is also an important aspect of machine learning for 
training, testing and validation. More data could result that 
models could be created that could be applicable to a variety 
of server set ups and content.. 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
LDDoS attacks are well known for their stealth, with static 
snort signatures unable defend and the traditional volumetric 
DoS and DDoS attack mitigation strategies being redundant. 
Most mitigation advice focuses on the necessity of limiting 
the number of connections per IP address to the webserver. 
This will be ineffective for a distributed attack, which would 
still require far less zombie nodes than a standard 
volumetric attack.  
The primary aim of the research was to ascertain if machine 
learning could be used to detect malicious LDDoS attacks 
amongst legitimate activity, utilising artificial intelligence 
and TCP flow metadata. Following an evaluation of a 
number of algorithms over a mix of simulated and real data, 
it was demonstrated that stealthy application layer 
distributed LDoS attacks can be accurately categorised from 
legitimate traffic using features associated with their TCP 
flows. A range of AI algorithms can use these features to 
accurately predict the presence of attack streams; given the 
evaluated algorithms, the most accurate ones appeared to be 
decision trees and k-NN.  
The accuracy achieved within the experiments is 
comparable or an improvement on much 
of the research analysed within the literature review. [15] for 
a slow read application layer DoS attack achieved accuracy 
of 99.37% with their random forest classifiers. This 
experiment achieved between 99.41% and 99.94%. Whilst 
only a slight increase, in a real word environment this can 
mean the difference between a successful attack and one 
that is mitigated. [4] in their study on IP flows of botnets 
achieved 97% accuracy for detection of Citadel and 86% for 
Zeus using decision trees and Naïve Bayes. The decision 
trees within across all four experiments were higher, with k-
fold cross validated figures between 99.88% and 99.97%. 
[14] trained neural networks to detect a variety of DoS 
attacks from packet header analysis and achieved and 
accuracy of 98%. A Probabilistic Neural Network trained to 
detect attacks by [17] achieved 97.89% accuracy. The DNN 
used within these experiments achieved between 97% and 
99.9%.  
Future work could involve using a wider range and larger 
volume of real-world data. Cloud computing platforms 
capable of network simulation, data storage, data analytics 
and machine learning can provide better data sources and 
processing capability. Lastly, integration within an 
aggregated SIEM solution could allow a richer feature set, 
including webserver metrics such as connection events, 
CPU load and memory usage. This would likely lower the 
chances of false positives outside of a simulated 
environment. 
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